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Our strong support for the State of Israel 
and concern for Israel’s long-term security, 
health and future charged the Inter-Agency 
Task Force on Israeli Arab Issues with 
the challenge to educate North American 
Jewry on majority/minority relations in 
Israel and to make civic equality in Israel 
a priority for the Jewish people.  The 
strength of the Task Force is our diver-
sity.  We are led by a Steering Committee 
made up of The American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee, The Andrea and 
Charles Bronfman Philanthropies, The 
Anti-Defamation League, The Conference 
of Presidents of Major American Jew-
ish Organizations, The New Israel Fund, 
Rabbi Brian Lurie and UJA-Federation of 
New York.  As exhibited by our leadership, 
our membership transcends the political 
and ideological boundaries of the Jewish 
communal spectrum and is united by our 
mission to educate North American Jewry 
on the issues facing 20 percent of Israeli 
society, one of every five Israelis – the 
Arab citizens of the State of Israel.
The Andrea and Charles Bronfman Phi-
lanthropies commissioned the Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research Firm to poll a 
diverse cross-section of American Jews 
who contribute to pro-Israel and/or Jewish 
organizations on the various reasons why 
they donate to Israel, their perceptions of the 
current realities in Israel and their knowledge 
of Israel’s Arab minority. The survey par-
ticipants ranged in age, gender, geographic 
location, type of organization and level of 
annual giving upwards of $100,000.
The following report highlights realities 
and perceptions, the possibilities and the 
great amount of work that needs to be 
done to educate North American Jewry 
on what the Or Commission* determined 
to be the most sensitive and important 
domestic issue facing Israel today.  This 
official Israeli board of inquiry noted spe-
cific action items necessary to give true 
equality to the country’s Arab citizens in 
accordance with the essence of the State 
of Israel as a democracy.  In this context, 
the Or Commission stressed that Israel 
must initiate, develop and operate pro-
grams to quickly close gaps in education, 
housing, industrial development, employ-
ment and services.
I share these findings with you in the hope 
that we can continue to increase awareness 
of the issues and advance the mission of the 
Task Force.
Sincerely,
Jessica Balaban
Executive Director
Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli Arab Issues
www.IAtaskforce.org
* The Or Commission is an official Israeli board 
of inquiry that convened after the violent events 
in 2000 when the government of Israel pledged 
to make elimination of inequality and discrimi-
nation between Jewish and Arab citizens a top 
national priority.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At 20 percent of the population and 
growing, Arabs constitute a significant 
minority population in Israel. As a minority 
population, Israeli Arabs face different 
circumstances relative to Israeli Jews in 
terms of quality of life, including discrep-
ancies in life expectancy, infant mortality, 
education, employment and standard of 
living. The Inter-Agency Task Force seeks to 
educate the American Jewish community 
on majority/minority relations in Israel; to 
increase awareness of economic, educa-
tional and social service weaknesses facing 
Israeli Arab communities; and to increase 
grant-making in Israeli Arab communi-
ties – all areas where the Task Force sees 
considerable need. In a domestic environ-
ment preoccupied with the war on terrorism 
and uncomfortable with the Muslim world, 
however, fundraising in this area is difficult, 
particularly if foundations are perceived to 
be making choices that help Israeli Arabs at 
the expense of Israeli Jews. 
This memo presents the key findings from 
over 50 in-depth interviews with significant 
Jewish donors.1 The research explores 
the reasons people contribute to Jewish 
organizations, benchmarks how much 
opposition there might be from significant 
donors to the Jewish community if founda-
tions increase philanthropy in the Israeli 
Arab sector, and identifies messages that 
can help foundations frame their choices 
to donors. 
We find a wide range of attitudes toward 
the issue of philanthropy for Israel’s Arab 
communities. At heart, contributors are 
committed to Israel and hope their dona-
tions can contribute to the survival of 
Israel for generations to come. They value 
the democratic principles that Israel and 
the United States share, especially equality 
under the law and equality of opportunity. 
At the same time, their loyalties are primar-
ily toward Israel as a Jewish state, which 
creates some tension over direct support for 
Israeli Arab communities, stemming from 
a concern that supporting Israeli Arabs will 
undercut the needs or interest of Jews in 
Israel. Moreover, in a country characterized 
by many inequalities (e.g., secular versus 
orthodox, new immigrant groups, etc.), 
some donors wonder if Israeli Arabs, a group 
about whom some are uninformed and 
whose loyalty to Israel is sometimes ques-
tioned, are the best place for investment. 
It is possible to persuade some reluctant 
donors of the urgency of the situation and 
the benefit of funding initiatives to help 
Israeli Arabs. The most effective frame-
work reminds donors of the democratic 
character of Israel, a nation that guaran-
tees equal treatment to all its citizens, 
and at the same time makes the point 
that equity is necessary for the long-term 
survival of Israel.
 1 This research is based on 51 in-depth interviews 
conducted with donors in the Jewish community 
between April 2006 and May 2007. For more 
methodological details, please see Appendix A. 
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KEY FINDINGS
•	Most	donors	give	out	of	a	profound	con-
nection to the State of Israel and a deep 
connection to the Jewish people. There 
is a strong belief in the importance of 
preserving of Israel as a homeland, 
a place for Jews, and as a nation that 
connects Jews around the world. 
Maintaining the integrity of Israel as a 
Jewish state is of paramount concern.
•	There	is	considerable	variance	in	depth	
of knowledge about domestic affairs in 
Israel and even more about how Israeli 
Arabs live. Donors who read the Israeli 
press are much more likely to be knowl-
edgeable about the Israeli Arab popula-
tion than those who read the United 
States press or depend upon bulletins 
or newsletters from Jewish organiza-
tions. Donors who often travel to Israel, 
moreover, are more likely to understand 
the geography (i.e., separateness) of 
where the Israeli Arabs live and to have 
observed infrastructural and housing 
differences in Israeli Arab villages.
•	Regardless	of	their	levels	of	knowledge,	
donors suspect that Israeli Arabs live 
less well than Israeli Jews and experi-
ence social discrimination. At the 
same time, many donors assume that 
all Israeli citizens have equal rights 
and are treated equally under the law. 
Donors can imagine that Israeli Arabs 
experience discrimination, but they 
also posit that, as a democratic na-
tion, Israel affords them equal social 
and political rights.
•	Respondents	are	divided	on	whether	
the situation of Israeli Arabs should 
be a priority for donors. Nearly equal 
numbers describe it as a high priority, 
a medium priority and a low priority. At-
titudinally, donors who feel that helping 
Israeli Arabs should be a high priority 
tend to express a social justice world 
view when it comes to Israel and sup-
port establishing a baseline standard 
of living for all citizens. Donors who 
rate it a lower priority tend to hold a 
security worldview when it comes to 
Israel and tend to focus on the secu-
rity threats (inside and outside) to the 
State of Israel.
•	Donors	who	support	increased	fund-
ing for Israeli Arab issues offer both 
principled and instrumental reasons 
for their support. First, many see it 
as an ethical imperative intrinsic to 
both Judaism and the requirements 
of a democratic state. Second, many 
believe that reducing social inequal-
ity would lead to better internal and 
external relations, which would re-
sult in greater security and stability 
for Israel.
•	Donors	who	oppose	increased	fund-
ing for Israeli Arab issues offer a 
range of reasons. Some prefer to 
help Jews specifically; given limited 
resources, helping Jews in Israel is 
a higher priority for them. Others 
think there are many equally impor-
tant concerns, and they have a hard 
time singling out Israeli Arabs for 
special efforts. Some express doubts 
that funding from the Diaspora will 
solve major problems like potential 
terrorist threats or large demograph-
ic change. Finally, some simply do 
not trust that the money will be used 
appropriately; they wonder where the 
money will go, who will administer it, 
and who will provide oversight.
•	More	generally,	we	encounter	some	
resistance to direct assistance to 
Israeli Arab communities if this aid is 
seen as coming at the expense of the 
Jewish community in Israel. Instead, 
many donors would like to see as-
sistance that helps both Jews and 
Arabs, rather than help that targets 
a specific group. Also, the recent 
treatise Future Vision poses real 
challenges to even the donors most 
supportive of Israeli Arab causes 
because it is seen as undermining the 
Jewish character of Israel. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Framing
•	The	strongest	messaging	to	help	
Israeli Arab communities asserts that 
Israel is a democratic state, built upon 
values such as equality and equal 
rights. Israel should be, in donors’ 
views, a country where people have 
equal economic opportunity and cer-
tainly should not face discrimination 
because of faith or ethnicity. Israel’s 
democratic character is a core piece of 
what these donors love about Israel, 
and it is disturbing and distressing 
when the State does not live up to 
this promise. As some donors point 
out, equal treatment of all its people 
will be necessary for the long-term 
survival of the State of Israel.
•	This	framework	is	most	compelling	
to donors who already hold a social 
justice worldview; for donors more 
focused on security, concerns about 
the impact of population growth 
among Israeli Arabs and the poten-
tial security threat posed by Israeli 
Arabs are somewhat more compelling 
arguments. That said, security focused 
donors comprise a harder group to 
engage on social justice issues; they 
simply believe that Israel faces more 
important issues.
•	Even	some	of	the	most	supportive	
potential donors are cautious about 
giving specifically and directly to 
Israeli Arabs. The Inter-Agency Task 
Force needs to carefully consider how 
it frames its giving, as many donors 
would prefer to support programs that 
help both Jews and Arabs, rather than 
singling out one population. More-
over, some donors are concerned that 
quality of life differences related to 
infrastructure are so fundamental to 
how the State operates that they really 
are the responsibility of the Israeli 
government and not the Diaspora. 
Rather, these donors would like to see 
programs that promote better rela-
tions between Israelis and Arabs as 
opposed to direct aid.
Targeting
•	In	approaching	philanthropy	geared	
toward helping Israeli Arabs, it is 
important to think carefully about the 
mechanism for giving. Donors to only 
a very few organizations (for example 
the Abraham Fund or the New Israel 
Fund, in this study) give specifically to 
help Israeli Arabs. Others rely on um-
brella organizations like the Federa-
tions or Hadassah to make decisions 
about how to give to Israel. Working 
with these organizations on their 
giving strategies – as much as with 
donors – is crucial to increasing levels 
of support for Israeli Arab causes. 
•	We	see	that	the	greatest	potential	for	
increased giving to assist the Israeli 
Arab community comes from the bet-
ter informed donors who articulate 
social justice concerns about Israel. 
There is clearly untapped potential 
among these donors, many of whom 
are quite sympathetic but simply do 
not know much about the issues facing 
the Israeli Arab community.
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DEEP AND ABIDING  
COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL 
DRIVES GIVING
Donors are driven by a profound con-
nection to the State of Israel and to 
the Jewish people. Donating is not only 
viewed as “the right thing to do,” it is 
also a means to preserve the State of 
Israel. Equally as important, donors want 
to preserve Israel as a Jewish state. 
Most people donate out of a deep con-
nection to the State of Israel and a deep 
connection to the Jewish people. Donors 
are strongly Jewishly identified and look 
upon Israel as a homeland for Jews. For 
some donors, this view is quite personal, 
and they describe Israel as a home even if 
they happen to live in the United States. 
Though only a couple of donors explicitly 
mention the Holocaust, it is clear that 
loyalty to Israel is ultimately connected 
back to Israel’s origin as a “safe haven” for 
Jews in a world where at best they are a 
minority and at worst face hostility. Do-
nors want to ensure the survival of the State 
of Israel, and some think of the survival of 
Israel as a metaphor for the survival of the 
Jewish people.
I contribute because blood courses 
through my veins and arteries. And just 
as blood courses through my veins and 
arteries, I would contribute to pro-Israel 
activities. In the same vein, it is that 
important to me. It is my life, it is 4,000 
years of my history, it is the very essence 
of my spirituality, it is the critical 
aspect of being Jewish. 
I believe that the strength of Israel, a 
strong Israel means a strong Jew-
ish people. And I feel like Israel is 
an integral part of my own personal 
Jewish identity, and my own visits to 
Israel have played an important role 
in the building of my Jewish iden-
tity and will do the same for future 
generations. So really, the thing that 
motivates all of my giving is Jewish 
continuity. And I feel that Israel plays 
a key role in ensuring Jewish continu-
ity for disparate Jews. 
I think Israel needs to be a Jewish 
country. I think that’s why it was 
founded and sort of its reason for 
existing.
The routes to donating are diverse, but 
many donors have grown up in families with 
a strong connection to tzedakah. Many 
talk about being raised by parents who 
regularly gave to organizations, Jewish 
and non-Jewish. Some feel an obligation to 
give because of their Jewish values, invok-
ing the Jewish ethic around giving. 
As far as contributing money to orga-
nizations, my parents always did, and 
it just seemed like that was a natural 
thing to do. 
I was raised with a very strong, you 
know, sort of sense of Jewish com-
munity responsibility and got a very 
strong Jewish education, you know, the 
day school level and high school, so my 
thinking is driven by how I see myself 
and the notion of also giving back 
and helping to support things that are 
socially and politically important. 
For others, an organization came to them 
and offered an opportunity to get involved 
with Jewish causes. Once invited to give 
to an organization, exposure to the issues 
facing Israel sparked an interest, and 
involvement grew. 
I was asked to co-chair a dinner. And at 
the dinner, I saw a video and learned 
more about the organization and then 
was invited to join the lawyers’ com-
mittee, and that’s how I got involved. 
I had a friend,… and he said to me, 
“You would love to go to the Young 
Leadership Conference in Washington; 
you would love that.” And I did. I went, 
“This is fantastic.” And from that point 
on, I was hooked. 
A few mention direct, life changing experi-
ences in Israel that created a connection 
with the State and therefore led to an 
interest in donating to Israel. In fact, the 
vast majority of donors in this study have 
been to Israel at least once, and some 
travel there regularly. These experiences 
are either personal (e.g., considering 
making aliyah) or connected to a program 
actively working in Israel (e.g., Project 
OTZMA, Federation missions in Israel). 
After my first trip to Israel in 1976, I re-
ally gained an understanding of why we 
need Israel. At that time I wanted to 
make aliyah, and I’m not giving up yet. 
I wasn’t doing any kind of philanthropy 
as a kid. I was doing community service 
and things like that. But then when I 
went to Israel, let’s see, my senior year 
in college was my first time in Israel, 
that was in ‘95, ‘96, right after Rabin 
was assassinated was when I went. 
And then I was working in the Jewish 
community, and then I went on Project 
OTZMA. I worked for Hillel for two years 
before I went on Project OTZMA, and 
then I stayed another year in Israel. 
And I think Project OTZMA exposed me 
to the reality of Israel, not the myth 
of Israel, and I worked in Palestinian 
Israeli schools and Jewish schools. And 
I worked with undocumented foreign 
workers, and I worked with the Bedouin 
community, I mean, every community 
you could imagine, the Ethiopian com-
munity, the olim, everybody. And then 
you see what’s really going on. 
My Jewish sense really came, my Israel 
support… really came more recently and 
was really to some extent developed to 
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a much higher degree when I went on 
a mission with the Jewish Community 
Federation Board last November…. I 
had always marveled at how a country 
in that kind of conflict could function. 
And we met with such outstanding 
people who clearly just went on with 
their lives…. The passion that I saw 
there; we met some remarkable Arab 
Israelis. We met people who worked in 
conjunction, went to schools in the up-
per Galilee. My wife, who’s not Jewish, 
was as equally impressed as I was. We 
made the biggest contribution. 
Regardless of how these donors begin 
donating to Israel, the act of giving to 
Israel plays an important role in their 
lives; it is an expression of their Jewish 
identities, a sign of religious commit-
ment and, for some, a statement of their 
political beliefs. 
PROUD OF ISRAEL, BUT 
AWARE OF SHORTCOMINGS
Donors are proud of Israel, which they see 
as a strong country built in a relatively 
short period of time. They believe that 
Israel’s strength rests upon the character 
of its people and the country’s determi-
nation to preserve its existence. At the 
same time, few believe Israel is perfect, 
even among its strongest supporters. 
Donors understand that there are press-
ing domestic issues such as economic 
inequality (despite the overall growth 
of the economy) and conflict between 
the religious and secular. There is great 
awareness of the corruption issues facing 
the current government and real concerns 
about competence post-Lebanon. In other 
words, love of Israel does not blind donors 
to the real challenges the country faces, 
some of which are of its own making. 
Donors share a common view that Israel’s 
main strength lies in its people: their 
determination and ability to persevere, 
their brainpower, their strength of char-
acter and moral fiber, and their ability to 
survive adversity. There is real pride that 
the country survives and thrives despite 
its hostile surroundings.
Strength as a nation,… its people, its 
know how because of its technology, 
because of its Army. Its people have a de-
termination to be Israelis, the majority 
of them do. The Jewish people will live. 
I think [Israel’s strength] is probably 
its intellectual and moral character. 
Of course everyone knows that it has 
significant, you talk about strength in 
the physical sense, it has a powerful 
military, but that is not sufficient, and 
I think that the ideology is probably 
what helps it survive in the face of a 
very difficult situation. 
[Israel is] strong and independent. 
They do what they think is in their in-
terest, and they don’t cow-tow to other 
countries or regions or governments, 
and they maintain their own strength. 
They keep themselves strong so they 
don’t have to depend on somebody 
else’s protection.
Others feel that Israel draws strength from 
being a democratic state, a place that 
upholds democratic values. 
[Israel] has many [strengths]: I think 
its resolve, its institutions and its com-
mitment, ultimately, to democracy. 
I think its Jewish identity is impor-
tant and its democratic values are 
important.
Democracy in the middle of the Arab 
world.
But donors are also aware of Israel’s weak-
nesses, ranging from security challenges to 
corruption. Above all, donors see internal 
conflict among different groups as a real 
challenge for Israel. This comes up most 
frequently as it relates to the Orthodox 
community and the role it plays in society 
and public policy making. But concerns 
about divisiveness emerge across a number 
of dimensions, including between Jews 
and Muslims but also within the problem 
of integrating new immigrant communi-
ties. In fact, people who know less about 
the Israeli Arab situation are apt to liken 
the differences between Israeli Arabs and 
Jews to other internal divisions, including 
Ethiopian Jews, the differences between 
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Orthodox and secular Jews, and in a few 
cases, race relations in the U.S. In fact, the 
domestic challenge of immigration issues, 
especially as presented by the Ethiopian 
Jews, is mentioned as a problem for Israel 
almost as often as the Israeli Arab situation. 
 
[Israel has] got so much going for it 
because it’s such a diverse population 
with such talent and such incredible 
passion and education and caring and 
having a Jewish value system, and yet 
its divisiveness and lack of community 
feel, at the same time, I think is its 
biggest challenge. 
The government is run by the ultra-
conservative Orthodox, and that gets 
in the way a lot. 
It’s a very kind of stratified, divided 
society. I’m talking the religious/
secular divide, the numerous cultures. 
Its strength is that it’s a place to try 
and integrate all Jews and bring them 
together.... But their weakness, I don’t 
think they’ve been able to totally deal 
well with, as I say, the different cul-
tures, and particularly the religious/
secular issue; that’s a problem. 
 
Many donors, while acknowledging a 
relatively strong economy, also perceive 
that Israel is a nation with real economic 
problems. Nearly all respondents mention 
the growing gap between rich and poor; they 
understand that only certain people benefit 
from Israel’s economic growth. They see an 
underclass – which includes Israeli Arabs and 
immigrant groups such as Ethiopians, Russians 
and others – that Israel has not successfully 
integrated into society economically.
Finally, many donors have real concerns 
about the educational system in Israel. 
Given that many see Israel’s “brainpower” 
as a major strength, they are discouraged 
by what they see as inequities within the 
educational system and a decline in the qual-
ity of education. This is a vivid example of 
social inequalities that donors see within 
Israel. To these donors, an unequal educa-
tional system is troubling, and they worry 
it perpetuates unequal opportunity with 
the potential for disastrous consequences 
in years to come. 
You can’t have a democratic state 
where there is such a huge gap between 
the different groups, you know? Let’s 
just say the socio-economic groups. If 
you go to Israel and see the schools, 
it’s appalling. So I don’t know what to 
say. I mean, you just can’t have that. I 
don’t want to say it’s bound for revolu-
tion, but it’s certainly bound for chaos. 
One of the weaknesses at this point, 
I think, is the social economic gap, 
poverty rates, the growing distance 
between the very poor and the other 
people. Their educational system, 
which used to be one of the greatest in 
the world, is now behind all these third 
world countries in achievement. 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ISRAELI 
ARAB COMMUNITY UNEVEN
Donors come to this issue with very differ-
ent levels of knowledge about the Israeli 
Arab community. Most have at least a 
vague understanding that there are Arab 
citizens of Israel and that they live dif-
ferently from Jews. But fewer are aware of 
the conditions under which these com-
munities live and, even more importantly, 
how the situation has come to evolve 
over time. It is important to understand 
what donors know about the Israeli Arab 
community and how they learn about this 
community, as there is a direct correla-
tion between knowledge and support for 
greater philanthropic efforts. 
In this study, we find no common baseline 
of information about Israeli Arabs. Some 
people know next to nothing about this 
minority group, while others are extremely 
knowledgeable. When we ask donors about 
Israel’s domestic situation, roughly 20 of 
the 51 respondents proactively mention the 
Israeli Arab situation without prompting 
from the interviewer.
Following news about Israel, and in 
particular reading the Israeli press, makes 
a difference in knowledge about Israeli 
Arabs. People who read the Israeli press 
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Figure 1: Proactive and prompted 
mentions of Israeli Arab situation
Thinking about all of the domestic issues 
that Israel faces, what domestic issue do 
you think is Israel’s biggest challenge?
Proactive
mention,
39%
Prompting
required,
61%
are much more likely to know the size of the 
Israeli Arab population (which is roughly 20 
percent and growing), make the assertion 
that there are social and economic inequali-
ties, and document real tensions between 
the Jewish and Muslim communities. The 
most knowledgeable also know there is 
religious diversity among Israeli Arabs, 
including Muslims, Christians and Druze. 
Having a personal experience of the Israeli 
Arab community makes a difference as 
well. Some seek out these experiences, and 
others come by them passively. Regardless, 
donors who have traveled throughout Israel 
are more likely to understand the geogra-
phy of where Israeli Arabs live and to have 
seen Arab villages. They understand there 
is segregation between Jews and Israeli Ar-
abs. They also describe infrastructural and 
housing differences in Arab communities 
compared with the rest of the country. 
I’ve visited Arab villages from time to 
time, and what I’ve seen is not very 
pleasing. Their physical situation is not 
good. In some communities there are 
open sewers in the streets. 
I remember driving around and seeing 
the areas in which [Israeli Arabs live], 
and this is really primarily in Jerusalem 
and Tel Aviv, although we did drive 
all over the country. But it was just 
that they, the Israeli Arabs did not 
seem to be, their living circumstances 
seemed to be less prosperous, let’s say, 
than the typical Israeli. But, again, I 
remember the conversations there, one 
of the Israelis we were talking to said 
that they didn’t feel that the Israeli 
Arabs worked as hard to change that 
circumstance as Jewish Israeli citizens. 
So I don’t know if that was just preju-
dice speaking or if that was reality, but 
I do remember the conversation. 
On the other hand, donors who read the 
American press or are infrequent visitors 
to Israel have little concrete knowledge of 
the demographic composition of the Israeli 
Arab population or of the social and eco-
nomic circumstances of Arab life. Similarly, 
standard communication coming from Jew-
ish organizations to members and donors 
does not lead to in-depth knowledge of the 
Israeli Arab situation. Donors who depend 
on e-alerts or newsletters from Jewish 
organizations to keep up with the news 
from Israel are clearly less familiar with 
the issue than those who regularly read the 
Israeli press.
 
Regardless of the level of concrete knowl-
edge, when we ask about the situation of 
Israeli Arabs, donors can easily guess that 
they live less well than Israeli Jews and 
even experience discrimination. As we see 
above, there is great awareness of conflict 
and inequality in Israel. Many know, or at 
least suspect, that there is an unequal dis-
tribution of resources within the State, for 
instance, with Israeli Arab schools receiv-
ing less funding than Jewish schools. 
[Israeli Arabs] generally don’t have 
the same standard of living, they don’t 
have the same educational level. If you 
read enough Israeli newspapers, they 
claim, and I don’t know if it’s true or 
not, it may very well be true, that their 
schools are not funded to the same 
level as non-Arab schools. 
I would imagine that there is some 
[difference between Israeli Jews and 
Israeli Arabs]. I don’t know for a fact. 
I have never been to an Arab home. I 
have been to some of the Jewish Israeli 
homes but not the Arabs, and I don’t 
know that driving through the country 
I would recognize, other than I under-
stand through the rooftops, how the 
buildings are built, that you can tell 
which is more of an Arab community. 
I feel that the Arab communities are 
not, they are treated as second class 
citizens. Their electrical system, if they 
don’t do it, nobody does it, and yet they 
are part of the government.... Maybe 
I’m wrong, maybe it has changed, but 
I have heard too many people speak 
about the embarrassment… because of 
the lack of funding for that. 
Donors imagine that Israeli Arabs experi-
ence discrimination and inequality relative 
to Jews, but they also assume that as 
9a democratic nation, Israel should and 
does afford them equal social and political 
rights. In other words, they believe that the 
economic hardship Israeli Arabs experience 
comes from discrimination by individuals 
within the system, not necessarily from the 
system itself. 
Anyone who is a citizen of Israel 
certainly deserves the same, whatever 
accommodations might be made in 
terms of social services or education 
or access to vote or whatever that 
would be. I would certainly think that 
everybody deserves exactly the same 
if they’re a citizen. That should be no 
different than it is here. 
I would have to say I’m sure [Israeli 
Arabs] are treated differently. I would 
like to say that in the courts and in 
the official things, that they’re not.... 
Nevertheless, people who carry out all 
these things on a lower level, police-
men, etc., people have their own bi-
ases.... Can we legislate how individu-
als act? We can’t do that. But we can 
at least have appropriate laws and try 
to have control [so] that it would help 
them as much as possible. 
AMBIVALENCE ABOUT THE 
ISRAELI ARAB COMMUNITY
Few donors see the Israeli Arab population 
as an imminent threat to Israel, but many 
do see this group as a potential threat. 
Even supporters of expanding philan-
thropic work among Israeli Arabs worry 
that having a disgruntled or disenfran-
chised population within Israel’s borders 
could potentially pose a risk to the State. 
But there are real differences in ascrib-
ing blame for the current situation. Some 
see it as an outgrowth of Israeli Arabs 
being victims of discrimination and social 
inequality. Others, however, wonder if the 
segregation is self-imposed by adherence 
to Islamic fundamentalism or even loyalty 
to the larger Palestinian cause. Clearly, 
one’s perspective on the source of 
inequality affects willingness to support 
Israeli Arab causes. 
When donors try to think about the Israeli 
Arab point of view, they consider a number 
of possibilities. First, some note that 
Israel’s prosperity and democracy puts 
Israeli Arabs in a better situation than 
they might experience elsewhere in the 
Middle East. There may be discrimination 
and other problems, but they have equal 
rights and educational opportunities not 
available elsewhere. Donors also express 
empathy for the internal conflict Israeli 
Arabs might feel if they have ties to family 
in the occupied territories or elsewhere 
in the Middle East where there is hostility 
towards Israel. 
Lord knows there have been enough op-
portunities to invite Israeli Arabs into 
the fold of the Intifada, and I think it 
happened maybe once or twice that an 
event over the last four or five years has 
been precipitated by an Israeli Arab. 
The very fact that it has been so small, 
miniscule, is indicative of the fact that 
the Israeli Arabs understand, and they 
don’t love the Israelis, but they under-
stand that they have it so much better 
off than outside Israel, and they ain’t 
going to rock the boat.
They must be caught, I mean, they 
must be very conflicted. A lot of them 
have family who lives outside of Israel. 
They must have family intermarried 
with Arabs living in Judea. 
At the same time, other donors believe 
Israeli Arabs’ Arab or Muslim identities 
create tension and divide their loyalties 
between Israel and their compatriots in the 
occupied territories or elsewhere. At least 
since the second Intifada, some donors feel 
there has been a change in relations with 
the Israeli Arab community, and they are 
unsure of whether or not Israeli Arabs are 
on Israel’s side or if Israeli Arabs are truly 
committed to Israel’s right to exist. Some 
donors even blame Israeli Arabs themselves 
for choosing a path of segregation and 
separation rather than making good faith 
attempts to work with Jewish Israelis. 
There is a percentage who are no 
longer wanting to be Israeli citizens 
or wanting Israel to exist and who 
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have identified with the terrorist 
movement.... Certainly there’s a very 
large percent of people who would 
much rather be Arab Israelis with equal 
rights, which was given to them in the 
constitution, than belong to any other 
country. But they did change, like, for 
example, they used to be Arab Israelis. 
Today they’re called Palestinian Israelis. 
They’ve changed their identity name. 
You don’t really know who is a friend 
and who isn’t. They might say that they 
want to be an Israeli Arab and they 
want citizenship, but the reason they 
want the citizenship is because of what 
they gain by being a citizen…. When 
we first started going, I remember guys 
used to say, “They are cousins; we are 
cousins.” That has changed. 
I don’t think the Jews are unfair to 
them. I think that they have kind of cho-
sen their own path. They kind of blame 
the Jews for the situation they’re in, but 
they were given opportunities in the 
past to kind of change things around, 
and they really didn’t agree to it. 
Regardless of the source of inequality and 
difference – imposed by discrimination or 
self-imposed – donors share a worry that 
the deep inequalities that currently exist 
between Israeli Arabs and Jews will have 
serious security consequences if left unad-
dressed, either from a few people acting 
alone or a community that sees terrorism in 
its midst and chooses to look the other way. 
Some donors who feel it should be a high pri-
ority to help Israeli Arabs look at this support 
as an investment in the survival of Israel.
I imagine that [Israeli Arabs] could 
cooperate with their brothers in the 
Palestinian area and that that might 
be very difficult even for Israeli intel-
ligence to figure it out. I think that they 
are human enough that if there was a 
major complication there, their loyal-
ties will be very divided and therefore 
unsure which way they would go. They’re 
human. So, yes, I would say they do 
constitute a threat but not to the extent 
that I want them thrown out. 
TO HELP OR NOT TO HELP
The discussion of whether or not to increase 
assistance to the Israeli Arab commu-
nity takes place in the context of uneven 
knowledge and understanding and differ-
ent perspectives about Israeli Arabs. It is 
clear that donors who enter the debate with 
greater knowledge and concern about social 
inequality place a higher priority on helping 
this community. At the same time, donors 
with less knowledge and less interest in 
Israel’s domestic challenges are less likely to 
place a priority on helping Israeli Arabs. Few 
express outright hostility, but we see clear 
concerns among the less supportive about 
how resources are distributed, seeking 
assurance that donations are not used indi-
rectly to fund terrorism or at the expense of 
helping Jews.
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Figure 2: Priority to help Israeli Arabs (percent responding)
How much of a priority should it be to help Arab Israelis? (percent responding)
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From the start of the study, donors are 
nearly evenly divided between believing 
the situation of Israeli Arabs should be a 
high priority (15 interviews, 29 percent), 
medium priority (20 interviews, 39 per-
cent) and low priority (16 interviews, 31 
percent) for U.S. based funders.
Donors who say it should be a higher pri-
ority are likely to have higher knowledge 
levels and an ideological point of view 
that makes them more attuned to social 
justice issues.1 These social justice donors 
are likely to express concerns about 
internal inequality in Israel and come to 
the discussion knowing something about the 
situation facing Israeli Arabs. 
Donors who suggest that helping Israeli 
Arabs should be a low priority often know 
very little about the situation. They tend 
to articulate more concerns about security 
than internal domestic issues; these 
security donors believe there are more 
important priorities (e.g., helping Jews, 
dealing with security) and are skeptical 
that the U.S. Jewish community should 
bear responsibility for mitigating the dif-
ferences between the populations.
Among donors who believe that helping 
Israeli Arabs should be a medium priority, we 
find that the issue is not at the top of their 
minds, but as they learn more, they see the 
need to address the Israeli Arab situation in 
a more serious way. This group is very rarely 
hostile to directing more aid to the Israeli 
Arab community, but they bring more am-
bivalence and less information and urgency 
to the issue. 
Social justice donors, who support increased 
funding to causes related to assisting Israeli 
Arabs, offer both principled and instru-
mental reasons. First, many cite the ethical 
imperative intrinsic to both Judaism and 
the requirements of a democratic state. 
As a democratic state, donors feel that it 
is important for Israel to provide equal 
rights and opportunities for all its citizens, 
regardless of religion. 
Let’s say you have a situation where 
the worst off Arab Israelis are so much 
worse off than the worst off Jewish 
Israelis, then I would want my money 
from a moral imperative perspective 
to help the Arab Israelis.... Say every 
Jewish Israeli was not hungry, [but] 
there were Israelis that were hungry, 
and they were Arab Israelis. I would 
want to feed them. They shouldn’t be 
hungry, that’s all there is.... I kind of 
think it’s a prioritizing order, basic 
needs should be addressed for all the 
population…. I think it’s an impor-
tant part of our culture to take care of 
people that aren’t our own. 
 
Many donors also believe that reducing social 
inequality would lead to better internal and 
external relations, which would mean 
more security and stability for Israel. 
They believe this is a problem that must be 
addressed because Israel will not survive 
if it has a significant proportion of its 
population living unhappily as second-class 
citizens. 
[Increased philanthropy] might show, 
reinforce the idea that [Israel is] a 
democratic society and that it pays 
close attention to all citizens, what-
ever their religion is, within Israel, and 
might even help to quiet criticism of 
other Arab countries as to Israel’s at-
titude towards the Muslim world.
I think that if Israel is going to survive, 
it’s going to survive by finding a way to 
accommodate its Arab population and 
have them feel part of the country. 
If you continue to treat them like 
second-class citizens and continue to 
High Priority 29 0 29 69
Medium Priority 39 41 48 23
Low Priority 31 59 24 8
LowTotal Medium
Knowledge of Israeli Arabs
High
Figure 3: Priority to help Israeli Arabs by knowledge of issue (percent responding)
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make them grow up in a bitter fashion, 
I think they’re more apt to look the 
other way when more fundamentalist 
activity occurs, or even support it.
I don’t see that you can possibly have 
a continuing State of Israel without 
[helping Israeli Arabs]…. What do you 
do? You relegate 20 to 25 percent of 
your population to continuing second-
class status? I don’t think so. We’ve 
had that experience in this country; it 
doesn’t work very well. 
Only by improving the economic and 
social conditions of Arabs in Israel. 
Particularly by increasing education 
and employment. Specifically employ-
ment for women. Once the social and 
economic condition of Arab citizens 
in Israel can be improved, there will 
be less animosity to a democratic 
government, which happens to be 
predominantly Jewish. 
Donors who oppose increased funding to 
causes related to assisting Israeli Arabs 
offer a range of reasons. Given limited 
resources, some feel that helping Jews in 
Israel is simply a higher priority. Others 
have a hard time singling out Israeli Arabs 
for special efforts, particularly if donors 
feel that Israeli Arabs are a group whose 
loyalty cannot be completely trusted. 
Some ask if the money will be used ap-
propriately. They wonder where the money 
will go, who will administer it, and who will 
provide oversight. 
 
I don’t want to be so selfish that 
every dollar I give has to be good  
for the Jewish people. But on the 
other hand, no one helps the Jews 
but the Jews. 
I think the benefit would be, hope-
fully, that [Jews and Arabs] could 
once again coexist peacefully. Then 
do you throw your money and make 
[the Israeli Arabs] stronger so that 
they can turn around and stab you in 
the back? That’s the big question. I 
don’t have an answer. 
 
I’m sure that the foundation would 
have to be very careful, as they 
would. I have no doubt in my mind 
that they would be incredibly careful 
about this just to make sure that 
the money is going where it should 
go and not to fund anything that it 
shouldn’t be funding in terms of ter-
rorist activities or extremist beliefs, 
etc., etc. And I don’t know enough 
about this population. 
Some look at the bigger picture and feel 
that Israel has more urgent problems. They 
acknowledge the real tension and hostility 
between Israeli Arabs and Jews but believe 
that Israel’s security is such a huge external 
challenge that improving internal relations 
simply is not a top priority. 
I just don’t feel that for the most 
part that would stop any of the 
terrorism that’s going on. It might 
help some, but it wouldn’t help the 
Israelis, I think. 
One of the [problems] is that Israel 
has to deal with security and can’t 
focus on social justice issues. 
A lot of the dollars are going to, 
obviously, the defense and not social 
issues. That’s a major problem. The 
next tier is [do] you take care of the 
Israelis or the Arabs? They’re probably 
pretty far down the ladder. 
These donors also raise questions about 
whose responsibility it is to help Is-
raeli Arabs; they even question whether 
philanthropy has an appropriate role to 
play. Many understand, at least at a basic 
level, that Israeli Arabs are not doing as 
well as Jewish Israelis but feel it is the 
government’s responsibility to provide 
infrastructure (roads, sewage, etc.), not 
Jews in the Diaspora. Even among people 
who think that helping Israeli Arabs should 
be a greater priority, many believe the 
Israeli government should be charged 
with dealing with fixing infrastructure and 
education problems. A few suggest that 
the best programs would foster interaction 
and relationships rather than trying to fix 
major social and economic problems. 
It’s everyone’s responsibility to help 
the Israelis. It’s primarily Israel’s re-
sponsibility as a nation to take care of 
their own. They may lack the resources 
because of the military burden, but 
I think there has to be, I don’t know 
enough about the Israeli taxes and 
the Israeli budget to really have an 
informed opinion about any budgetary 
reallocations that might be made, but 
they do need help. 
I don’t feel any responsibility. Why 
does the Diaspora have to take respon-
sibility that the Israeli government 
should have? 
It is also important to note that while there 
are many who see the benefit of directly 
funding work in Israeli Arab communities, 
some of the most supportive think that 
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INCREASING SUPPORT FOR 
PHILANTHROPIC EFFORTS  
IN THE ISRAELI ARAB  
COMMUNITY
During each interview, we introduced 
frameworks designed to gauge if donors 
think that it is important to direct philan-
thropic efforts to lift up the Israeli Arab 
community. We tested four frameworks: 1) 
an inequality message, which pointed out 
the social, educational, political, economic 
and employment differences Israeli Arabs 
face; 2) a demographic message, which 
pointed out that the Arab population is 
growing at a faster rate, and it is therefore 
in Israel’s interest to build good relations 
with its growing number of Arab citizens; 
3) an equality message, which argued 
that as a democracy, Israel must guaran-
tee equal rights to all its citizens, which 
currently it does not do (using marriage 
residency laws as an example); and 4) a 
security message, which argued that Israel 
cannot risk its security by allowing the 
Arab minority to support terrorist causes. 
We find that the strongest messaging to 
help Israeli Arab communities presents the 
argument that Israel is a democratic state 
built upon values such as equality and equal 
rights. In donors’ views, Israel should be a 
country where people have equal economic 
opportunity and certainly should not face 
discrimination because of faith or ethnicity. 
More instrumentally, democracy, when oper-
ating properly, is not only the fairest form of 
government that confers the best treatment 
to all citizens, but it also leads to greater ac-
ceptance of Israel by the global community. 
In donors’ minds, Israel must present an 
image of an effective democracy, treating all 
its people equally, if it is to survive.
Our Jewish values and democratic values 
should be reflected in the government’s 
treatment of all of its citizens. It’s a core 
civil right, and it’s important for Israel’s 
security but also its image in the world. 
They’re Israeli citizens. Why shouldn’t 
they have the same rights as the others? 
Either you’re a citizen or you’re not. If 
you’re a legitimate citizen, shouldn’t you 
have the rights that other citizens have? 
If you look at what’s been happening 
over even the last couple of decades, 
history has come to prove to us that if 
you limit representation, it leads to more 
radical activity both in terms of at a state 
level and at the mass levels. And Israel 
is an absolutely fabricated nation state 
put in maybe the most difficult situation 
you could possibly think of in terms of 
creating a viable and stable land. And 
the only way, in my mind, that you’re ever 
going to see true stability and longevity 
in Israel is to make sure it’s a working 
democracy. And in order to make sure it’s 
a working democracy, you must, from the 
highest level, the highest political phi-
losophy of that nation, you must make 
sure that you are inclusive of minorities, 
not just politically, but socially as well, 
and the necessary institutions and infra-
structure that go along with that. 
these communities should not be singled 
out. Rather, they feel foundations should 
pick a cause (e.g., education or hunger) 
and make sure that both the Jewish and 
Arab communities benefit equally. This is 
a particularly important perspective that 
must be considered when thinking about 
how organizations do their philanthropic 
work in Israel. 
I would say if you’re giving directly to Arab 
organizations, it’s not going to help much. 
If it’s given toward programs that foster 
integration between Arab and Jewish 
populations, it will be successful. 
2 We should note that this sample includes contribu-
tors to the Abraham Fund and the New Israel Fund 
who are already highly attuned and supportive of 
efforts to help Israeli Arabs. They comprise 8 inter-
views and are among the most supportive donors.
The messaging does best, however, when 
phrased positively, invoking images of what 
Israel should be, rather than ascribing blame. 
Most donors are more comfortable address-
ing economic inequality and discrimination 
than the question of basic citizenship 
rights. As we see above, many assume that 
Israeli Arabs – as citizens – have the exact 
same rights as Jewish Israelis. These donors 
reject messaging that calls that belief into 
question; it is outside their framework for 
understanding Israel. As an example, most 
donors react negatively to both examples 
of different treatment – residency restric-
tions for non-Jewish spouses and pledging 
allegiance to Israel in order to serve in the 
Knesset. Most donors do not see having 
residency restrictions or having to declare 
one’s loyalty to the State of Israel as a viola-
tion of rights. 
I think that is a prime loophole to what 
I was saying before about [Israeli 
Arabs] sheltering terrorists. I think, 
you know, fake marriages have been 
done in other countries for reasons 
of that sort, so I would say they can’t 
bring, I think there should be strong 
restrictions on marrying Palestinians 
and bringing them into Israel. 
You know that an Arab Israeli who is a 
member of the Knesset has to pledge 
allegiance to the flag. I mean, every 
American has to do that, right? So it 
is assumed that every Jewish Israeli 
member of the Knesset does that. And 
it is not unreasonable after 50 years of 
war to ask an Arab Israeli to do that. Is 
that discriminating? I don’t know. 
Taking this a step further, many donors do 
not have a problem with rules – such as de-
claring one’s loyalty to the State – designed 
to preserve Israel as a Jewish state. Nearly 
every donor supports Israel in its cur-
rent form, with only 3 of 51 respondents 
saying they would be open to Israel as a 
non-Jewish, democratic state. 
Though not as uniformly persuasive as the 
democracy message, messaging can also be 
effective if it is more instrumental in nature 
and seeks pragmatic ends. In some ways, 
messages focused on population growth and 
internal security are informative as much as 
they are persuasive. Particularly for donors 
who are less informed and more security 
oriented, the population argument clarifies 
the scope and contours of the issue. The se-
curity message does very well among those 
with low levels of information, particularly 
as they tend to be the most conservative in 
their orientation toward Israel. What is 
key about the demographic and security 
arguments is that they argue that in order for 
Israel to survive and maintain its security, it 
is necessary to forge a better relationship 
with the Israeli Arab population. 
I mean, I don’t know a lot about the Arab 
Israeli population, but I think that tells 
you right off the bat what the population 
issues are, what we face. It strikes at the 
Jewish value component that we have a 
sense of, that there’s a sense of equality 
that we need to be dealing with, that 
there are social conditions and economic 
issues that we need to face and to sup-
port, and that this then will help us, help 
strengthen our Israeli state. 
If we improve their lives then they’re 
less likely to join terror organizations 
and become terrorists. I think the bot-
tom line is that the average Palestinian 
on the street or the average Israeli 
Arab wants to make a good living and 
have a place to live with their family. 
It’s the extreme factions that don’t. 
It is important to note, however, that donors 
who know more about Israeli Arabs largely 
reject the security argument – though some 
concede that happier people are less likely 
to commit terrorist acts – because they 
think the issues are more complex. 
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TARGETING EFFORTS  
We see that the greatest potential for 
increasing giving to assist the Israeli Arab 
community comes from the better informed 
donors who articulate social justice 
concerns about Israel. There is clearly 
untapped potential among these donors, 
many of whom are quite sympathetic but 
simply have not yet become completely 
conscious of the problem. In other words, 
some of the most supportive are not yet 
donors to Israeli Arab causes. Beyond 
information levels and worldview, there is 
little that distinguishes donors from each 
other; in other words, age, donation level 
and donor organization do not separate 
these donors from each other with regards 
to their interest in assisting the Israeli 
Arab community.2 
On the other hand, there is clearly targeting 
work to be done by looking at how donors 
give. There is a great deal of variation in 
what people know about how organizations 
direct their funds in Israel. Some donors 
very clearly direct their donations to specific 
organizations and causes (e.g., one respon-
dent only gives to social justice causes). We 
find this orientation particularly among the 
donors in our sample who already give to 
Israeli Arab causes. 
I have allocated a fair amount of my 
philanthropic dollars to that cause; 
[the recipient organization] dedicates 
not an insignificant percentage of the 
grants that they give to efforts to help 
in various ways Arab Israelis. So I do 
think that’s important. 
More frequently, donors give to organizations 
they trust, particularly if they share the same 
ideological view of that organization (e.g., 
AIPAC, the New Israel Fund). Other donors 
make all-purpose gifts; they give their 
major award to primarily one organization 
like a Federation or Hadassah that sponsors 
many programs in Israel. In fact, some 
donors are focused on giving in the United 
States, but they do know and support that 
their organizations also give to Israel.
I don’t have strong feelings about sup-
porting Israel, but I have confidence 
or I trust the judgments that are being 
made as far as certainly the [local Fed-
eration]… and the national organiza-
tions and so forth. 
You’re not associated with [the local 
Federation], but you probably know 
that there is a very, very wide net of 
services and programs funded…. So it 
certainly is giving to Israel. But it also 
is giving to a wide variety of programs 
here. So I’ve always felt that they 
covered bases very nicely and we didn’t 
need to be going around looking for 
20 other specific Jewish charities to be 
able to donate to. 
…I really don’t like having to choose 
among agencies. I support a lot, I 
give a lot of small contributions to 
various agencies, primarily motivated 
by someone asking me if I would do 
something. But I don’t try to evaluate 
the relative merits of the agencies and 
so forth.
Given that many donors rely on umbrella or-
ganizations for directing philanthropy, it is 
as important to work with these organiza-
tions as with individual donors.
2 It is very difficult to distinguish donors demo-
graphically in small sample, qualitative research. 
It is possible that a large scale quantitative 
survey would find demographic patterns in sup-
port for increased philanthropic efforts to Israeli 
Arab causes.
FUTURE VISION  
One of the challenges with philanthropy to 
the Israeli Arab community comes as the 
Israeli Arab community begins to orga-
nize and demand rights that conflict with 
donors’ notions about what Israel should 
be. Future Vision, a treatise recently put 
forth from the Israeli Arab community on 
how the Israeli state should work with 
the Israeli Arab community, put forth 
a set of requests that raised questions 
and doubt about the author’s thoughts on 
Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. Note,
Jewish, Arab and joint Jewish-Arab groups 
in Israel are still debating this paper. 
Relatively few donors have heard about 
Future Vision. Of the 17 interviews con-
ducted after the Lebanon conflict, only 3 
had heard of Future Vision; two said they 
recalled something about it after hearing 
a brief description, and the remaining 12 
were unfamiliar with the document. Donors 
who are aware of Future Vision doubt it will 
ever get heard because “there are so few 
people who are really knowledgeable about 
really what’s going on. They just don’t take 
the time.” 
When told about the report, most donors 
vehemently disagree with its requests. 
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Yes, 18%
Yes, after 
description, 
12%
No, 71%
Figure 4: Heard about Future Vision 
(percent responding)
Have you heard anything recently about 
Israeli Arabs publishing any papers that 
deal with the future of Arabs in Israel and 
their relations with the state of Israel? 
(percent responding)
16
Donors reflect upon their a deep attach-
ment to Israel as a Jewish state, and do not 
want to see Israel as anything else. Donors 
react passionately. 
No. Very strongly against it. The trouble 
with me and Israel is that I am so emo-
tionally bound up in Israel that I can’t 
think straight. 
You can’t do that. The whole point of hav-
ing it as a state, as a Jewish State is our 
homeland and I guess when you use that 
world homeland, I see it as our home-
land, as Jews, not as a joint homeland. 
Future Vision does not leave donors sym-
pathetic to helping Israeli Arabs. It clearly 
suggests that Israeli Arabs do not share a 
common idea of what Israel should be. This in 
turn suggests to donors that they do not have 
Israel’s best interest in mind. Under such 
circumstances, donors anticipate that it will 
be difficult to persuade people that this is a 
population that needs and deserves support.
I think if those papers came out then 
people would be very against it and those 
organizations would lose a lot of support. 
I think it will be negative. I think even 
if people really want to help them, they 
still think that it really should be a Jew-
ish state. I don’t think it’s going to be 
positive for people who want to help. 
CONCLUSION  
There is great potential to increase atten-
tion and contributions to improve the status 
of Arabs in Israel. There are members of the 
donor community who understand – at a gut 
level – that there is social inequality in Israel 
that must be rectified for both principled 
and pragmatic reasons. For the most social 
justice minded of these donors, they simply 
need more information and education about 
the situation in order to support a greater 
commitment in this area. They believe that 
Israel has an obligation to live up to its 
democratic principles and that, as Jews, 
they have an ethical imperative to make sure 
that Israel’s citizens do not experience gross 
injustice or inequities.
At the same time, even the most progressive 
donors voice concern about the Future Vision 
initiative. They want to know that Israel will 
remain a Jewish state and that contribu-
tions will not inadvertently help people who 
have nefarious intentions toward Israel or 
Jews. Moreover, the burden on these donors 
to seek out information about these issues 
is high, especially if they do not read the 
Israeli press. The Task Force needs to care-
fully consider how it reaches out to potential 
donors and philanthropic organizations, 
particularly how it frames the informa-
tion it provides about its work. Potential 
donors want to know how donations will be 
channeled to causes and precisely whom 
they help. They want to know that these 
donations are not intended to undermine 
Israel as a Jewish state, but in fact, will 
strengthen a nation that they so strongly 
believe needs to survive.
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY  
Sector
Gender
Age range
Region
Donor Amount
Community 17
Service 26
Policy 8
Men 26
Women 25
Over 40 38
Under 40 13
East 27
West 12
Rust belt 12
$25K - $100K 23
$100K+ 15
n/a 13
Total 51
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner wrote and 
administered in-depth interviews with 51 
donors in the Jewish community. 35 inter-
views were conducted April through July 
2006, and 17 interviews were conducted 
March through May 2007. An eight-month 
hiatus was taken during the fielding period 
because of the conflict in Lebanon. 
Respondents were contacted and recruited 
to participate by contacts at Jewish orga-
nizations to which they donate. We aimed 
to interview large donors – people over 
the age of 40 who gave at least $25,000 
to their organization. Respondents were 
selected so the interview pool had a 
mix of people who donated $25,000 to 
$100,000 and $100,000 or more. We also 
interviewed 13 donors under age 40. For 
this group, there was no lower limit on the 
donation amount.
Donors were recruited to represent a mix 
of the community, service and policy sec-
tors; a mix of men and women; and a mix of 
donors from all over the United States.
Table 1: Interview counts
